Returning to Acosta: How In re A-B- Exemplifies the Need to Abolish the  Socially Distinct  and  Particularity  Requirements for a Particular Social Group by Cherney, Lauren
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice 
Volume 38 
Issue 2 Issue 2 Article 7 
2020 
Returning to Acosta: How In re A-B- Exemplifies the Need to 
Abolish the "Socially Distinct" and "Particularity" Requirements for 
a Particular Social Group 
Lauren Cherney 
University of Minnesota Law School, chern146@umn.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lauren Cherney, Returning to Acosta: How In re A-B- Exemplifies the Need to Abolish the "Socially Distinct" 
and "Particularity" Requirements for a Particular Social Group, 38 LAW & INEQ. (2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol38/iss2/7 
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is 
published by the University of Minnesota Libraries 
Publishing. 
169 
Returning to Acosta: How In re A-B- 
Exemplifies the Need to Abolish the 
“Socially Distinct” and “Particularity” 




Ms. A.B. suffered abuse at the hands of those nearest to her 
for the majority of her life.1 She lost her parents at a young age and 
was then put in the care of a family who abused her, both physically 
and verbally.2 She left their “care” in her twenties to marry.3 Soon 
after, her husband began abusing her as well.4 For the next fifteen 
years, Ms. A.B. suffered through physical, sexual, and emotional 
abuse from her husband.5 Her pleas for help to the Salvadoran 
authorities, her attempts to relocate within El Salvador, and even 
a divorce failed to keep her safe.6 Seeing no other choice, Ms. A.B. 
fled to the United States in hopes of gaining asylum.7 In December 
of 2016, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or “the Board”) 
granted Ms. A.B. asylum.8 Two years later, this decision was 
vacated.9 
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“Do not deprive the foreigner . . .   of justice.” Deuteronomy 24:17. 
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STUDIES, https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/matter-b/backgrounder-and-briefing-matter-b 
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 3. Id. 
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 5. Id. 
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 8. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 340 (A.G. 2018). 
 9. Id. 
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After running a campaign largely focused on restricting 
immigration and strengthening border control, Donald Trump 
entered office and began to implement policies in furtherance of 
those ends.10 Anti-immigration sentiment was also propagated by 
the officials appointed to leadership positions by the Trump 
Administration, including former Attorney General Jeff Sessions.11 
To further this anti-immigration agenda, in the summer of 2018, 
Sessions issued a groundbreaking policy decision in In re A-B-, 
narrowing the interpretation of a particular social group (PSG), 
particularly for survivors of “private crimes,” namely domestic and 
gang violence.12 This ruling reversed the grant of Ms. A.B.’s asylum 
because of perceived error in the Board’s standard of review.13 On a 
larger scale, this ruling reversed a more lenient interpretation of 
PSGs for survivors of domestic violence.14 Since this ruling, there 
has been much uncertainty about whether and how survivors of 
domestic violence can obtain asylum status in the United States.15 
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
created an international obligation to assist those who fit the 
 
 10. See generally David D. Sussman, Immigration, Trump, and Agenda-Setting 
in the 2016 Election, 41 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 75 (2017) (examining Donald 
Trump’s immigration policy strategy in the 2016 election). 
 11. Ryan T. Beckwith, ‘We Cannot Admit Everyone.’ Read a Transcript of Jeff 
Sessions’ Remarks on Ending the DACA Program, TIME (Sept. 5, 2017), 
http://time.com/4927426/daca-dreamers-jeff-sessions-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/3
U98-S8NF]. 
 12. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 343–44. In this Note, I choose to refer to 
individuals who have faced domestic violence as ’survivors.’ However, at times this 
Note will refer to the same group as ‘victims,’ primarily when quoting other sources. 
These terms should be understood interchangeably. 
 13. Dree K. Collopy et al., Matter of A-B-: Case Updates, Current Trends, and 
Suggested Strategies, AM. IMMIGRATION LAW ASS’N (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.aila.
org/infonet/matter-of-a-b-case-updates-current-trends [https://perma.cc/RV3P-
7GC4]. 
 14. Nolan Rappaport, Domestic Abuse Decision Doesn’t Change Asylum Law, 
Just Applies It Correctly, HILL (June 15, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/
immigration/392409-sessions-domestic-abuse-decision-didnt-change-asylum-law-
just-applied-it [https://perma.cc/59K7-4K75]. 
 15. See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR., ASYLUM PRACTICE ADVISORY: 
APPLYING FOR ASYLUM AFTER MATTER OF A-B- (2018), http://immigrantjustice.org/s
ites/default/files/content-type/resource/documents/2018-09/Matter%20of%20A-B-
%20Practice%20Advisory%20-%20Final%20-%2006.18_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/22D
Q-6JEB]; BLAINE BOOKEY, MATTER OF A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018), CTR. FOR 
GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES (June 22, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/conte
nt/dam/aba/administrative/crsj/committee/matter-of-a-b-webinar_6-22-2018
.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/58F4-AWSY]; Reena Arya, DHS Clarifies Its 
Guidance on Matter of A-B-, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGRATION NETWORK, INC. (July 30, 
2018, 8:00 PM), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/dhs-clarifies-its-guidance-matter-b 
[https://perma.cc/GZH2-RSE2]. 
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definition of a “refugee.”16 The relationship between this obligation 
and the treatment of survivors of domestic violence has proven to 
be complicated.17 Asylum is not meant to be an option for anyone in 
a difficult situation, but rather, an option for people who have been 
persecuted on account of their membership of a particular category 
outlined in the U.S. Code, such as race, religion, or PSG.18 Survivors 
of domestic violence have fit the definition of “refugee” through the 
PSG category. However, the standard for analyzing this category 
has shifted repeatedly, resulting in uncertainty for survivors 
seeking asylum.19 
This dilemma likely resulted, in part, because of the evolution 
of this category. Historically, PSGs related to “private crimes” 
typically involved individuals associated with gangs.20 Because 
these individuals were often seen as unsavory characters, a 
narrower interpretation of the PSG standard as opposed to the 
asylum categories faced little backlash. However, as more claims 
were made by survivors of domestic violence under the PSG 
category, this narrow interpretation started to appear cruel. 
Balancing the views toward these groups and the relationship 
between the obligation to refugees and the treatment of survivors 
of domestic violence has resulted in complications due to the moral 
obligation felt towards survivors.21 The backlash following In re A-
B-, for example, has shown that there is a general idea, among the 
public, that survivors of domestic violence should have the 
opportunity to enter the United States through the asylum 
system.22 However, balancing this moral mindset with the standard 
set forth to determine asylum eligibility has resulted in 
 
 16. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I, July 28, 1951, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150. 
 17. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 
Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 
107, 147–48 (2013) (noting that “whether a woman fleeing domestic violence will 
receive protection in the United States seems to depend not on the consistent 
application of objective principles, but rather on the view of her individual judge, 
often untethered to any legal principles at all”). 
 18. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018). 
 19. Jessica Marsden, Domestic Violence Asylum After Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE 
L.J. 2512, 2537 (2014). 
 20. See Christopher C. Malwitz, Particular Social Groups: Vague Definitions and 
an Indeterminate Future for Asylum Seekers, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 1149, 1150 (2018). 
 21. Marsden, supra note 19. 
 22. Ted Hesson & Josh Gerstein, Sessions Moves to Block Asylum for Most 
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unpredictable treatment of this group.23 In re A-B- exemplifies a 
recent narrowing of this standard.24 This restructuring resulted in 
immigration judges applying a narrower standard to claims 
involving PSGs than to the other categories eligible for asylum. 
The shaping of this standard began with In re Acosta, the first 
case to examine PSGs.25 Acosta, which set out a broad standard to 
determine PSG eligibility, simply required that the PSG be defined 
by an “immutable” characteristic.26 However, this standard was 
narrowed over time, and a three-part test was eventually 
implemented to determine asylum eligibility within the PSG 
category.27 This test requires that an applicant “establish that the 
group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable 
characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially 
distinct within the society in question.”28 These elements, 
particularly the elements of “socially distinct” and “particularity,” 
have caused confusion in various courts and have often resulted in 
overly harsh rulings.29 These rulings have been especially apparent 
with regard to survivors of gang violence.30 Survivors of domestic 
violence, on the other hand, had, until recently, received a more 
lenient interpretation, as showcased in In re A-R-C-G-.31 However, 
Sessions’ ruling in In re A-B- overrules this lenient standard.32 
Sessions, like many arbiters before him, confused and conflated the 
elements necessary to satisfy a PSG and consequently instituted an 
incorrect and overly harsh standard for survivors of private crimes. 
 
 23. Compare In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), overruled on 
other grounds by In re Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987), with In re M-
E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 227 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 24. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 340 (A.G. 2018). 
 25. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Malwitz, supra note 20 (explaining how the three-element test for PSG was 
established in the cases In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (B.I.A. 2014), and In re M-
E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227). 
 28. In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 208; In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 227. 
 29. Nicholas R. Bednar, Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary Requirements 
of “Particularity” and “Social Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 355 (2015); Clay Venetis, A Catch-22? The Social Distinction 
Requirement for Asylum, PROCEEDINGS (Mar. 21, 2017), https://proceedings.nyumoo
tcourt.org/2017/03/a-catch-22-the-social-distinction-requirement-for-asylum/ 
[https://perma.cc/CN5M-3L57]. 
 30. Tina Zedginidze, Domestic Abuse and Gang Violence Against Women: 
Expanding the Particular Social Group Finding in Matter of A-R-C-G- to Grant 
Asylum to Women Persecuted by Gangs, 34 LAW & INEQ. 221, 236 (2016). 
 31. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (B.I.A. 2014) (recognizing “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as a particular 
social group). 
 32. Id.; In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 340 (A.G. 2018). 
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Part I of this Note considers the requirements for falling under 
the PSG category when making an asylum claim, including the shift 
from the Acosta standard to the three-part test. Part II looks at the 
history of PSG interpretations regarding asylum claims made by 
survivors of domestic violence. Part III then considers the three 
main portions in the recent In re A-B- ruling. Finally, Part IV 
contends that In re A-B- conflated the factors necessary to prove a 
PSG and therefore exemplifies that the requirements of “socially 
distinct” and “particularity” have done more to confuse, rather than 
clarify, the requirements necessary to establish a PSG. Using this 
contention, this Note then argues that these two requirements 
should be abolished and that the Acosta standard should be 
reinstated. 
Sessions’ ruling in In re A-B- creates a harsh standard for 
survivors of domestic violence coming to the United States in hopes 
of gaining asylum status. This ruling was a misapplication of the 
analysis for the PSG category due to confusion and conflation 
caused by the “particularity” and “socially distinct” factors. 
Furthermore, this Note uses In re A-B- to demonstrate why these 
two requirements should be abolished and explains how a reversion 
to the Acosta standard will lead to a more consistent and correct 
implementation of the PSG category, as it will afford applicants in 
the PSG category the same process rights as individuals seeking 
asylum under other categories. 
I. A Brief History of the “Particular Social Group” 
Category for Asylum Claims 
A. The Requirements for an Asylum Claim and the Acosta 
Standard 
A non-citizen refugee qualifies for asylum in the United 
States.33 The Immigration and Nationality Act defines a “refugee” 
as “any person . . . who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is 
unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of, that 
country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 
on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
social group, or political opinion[.]”34 Though each category has its 
blurred edges and exceptions, there has been much debate and 
confusion as to what constitutes a PSG in particular. 
 
 33. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2018). 
 34. Id. 
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In 1985, the BIA addressed the category of PSG for the first 
time in its decision In re Acosta.35 The BIA created a standard that 
stood until around the turn of the century.36 In the Acosta case, the 
asylee claimed to be a member of the PSG of taxi drivers who 
refused to take part in guerrilla-sponsored work stoppages.37 The 
BIA implemented the interpretive cannon of ejusdem generis (“of 
the same kind”) and consequently construed PSG in relation to, and 
consistent with, the other four categories eligible for asylum.38 It 
found each other category to be a type of immutable characteristic, 
meaning the characteristic is “either beyond the power of an 
individual to change or is so fundamental to individual identity or 
conscience that it ought not be required to be changed.”39 Applying 
that idea to PSG, the BIA found it meant “persecution that is 
directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons 
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.”40 The BIA 
noted that shared past experiences or innate characteristics, even 
specifically pointing to “sex” as such a characteristic, could define a 
PSG.41 The BIA found this definition to be sufficient as it ensured 
equality between the categories of individuals seeking asylum and 
ensured that a “refugee is restricted to individuals who are either 
unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not 
be required, to avoid persecution.”42 
B. The Three-Element Test 
The creation of a category which potentially allows broad 
groups, such as those based on gender alone, created a fear of an 
opening of a floodgate of asylum claims for members of PSGs.43 
Though the other groups eligible for asylum were not narrowed, 
courts responded to this fear and began to narrow the PSG 
 
 35. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985). 
 36. Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Confounding Legal 
Standard for “Membership in a Particular Social Group”, 14-06 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 
1, 4 (2014). 
 37. In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 216–17. 
 38. Id. at 233. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 234. 
 43. See generally Karen Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: 
Fear of Floodgates or Call to (Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 119 (2007) 
(arguing that this fear is unfounded because acceptance of gender asylum has 
historically not given rise to a dramatic increase in the number of asylum claims). 
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category.44 In In re R-A-, the BIA denied asylum to an individual 
with a strong claim of domestic abuse.45 Though this case was 
eventually vacated, it signaled a shift in the BIA’s attitude and its 
initial distancing from Acosta.46 
Attempting to clarify the PSG standard, In re C-A- introduced 
the idea of “social visibility.”47 In re C-A- equated “social visibility” 
with recognizability, noting that “[s]ocial groups based on innate 
characteristics such as sex or family relationship are generally 
easily recognizable and understood by others to constitute social 
groups.”48 The Board claimed this idea was consistent with the 
Acosta standard.49 But confusion persisted, so the BIA again 
attempted to clarify the standard through In re A-M-E- & J-G-U- in 
which the BIA implemented both the “social visibility” and the 
“particularity” requirements into the PSG analysis.50 It created and 
interpreted the “particularity” requirement standard to necessitate 
an “adequate benchmark for determining group membership.”51 For 
example, the BIA found “wealthy” too “subjective, inchoate, and 
variable” to meet that standard.52 In 2008, the BIA ruled in In re S-
E-G- and in In re E-A-G-, officially adding “social visibility” and 
“particularity” to the Acosta standard of a “common immutable 
characteristic” and creating a three-part test to determine a PSG.53 
The Board claimed that such requirements would provide 
specificity and clarification to the Acosta standard, though it failed 
to address that this heightened standard created a narrower 
standard than the standard applied to other categories eligible for 
asylum.54 
 
 44. Helen P. Grant, The Floodgates Are Not Going to Open, but Will the U.S. 
Border?, 29 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1, 36 (2006). 
 45. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 2001) (vacating the BIA’s 1999 
decision). 
 46. Casper et al., supra note 36. 
 47. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 961 (B.I.A. 2006) (rejecting “noncriminal drug 
informants working against the Cali drug cartel” as a particular social group). 
 48. Id. at 959. 
 49. Id. at 956. 
 50. In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 4 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007) (denying “wealthy 
Guatemalans” as a particular social group). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. This test requires that an applicant “establish that the group is (1) 
composed of members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined 
with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question.” Malwitz, 
supra note 20, at 1150. 
 54. Id. 
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Though many Circuits fully adopted this three-part test,55 in 
other courts it resulted in skepticism and varying 
implementations.56 The Seventh Circuit rejected the “social 
visibility” requirement, as it found such a requirement arbitrary 
and inconsistent with its earlier decisions.57 The Third Circuit also 
failed to see how the idea of “social visibility” would be consistent 
with the Board’s prior decisions and, seeing no rationale for such a 
requirement, refused to adopt this requirement.58 The Third Circuit 
viewed “particularity” as just another way of requiring “social 
visibility” and subsequently refused to adopt that requirement as 
well.59 These circuit splits demonstrate that these requirements are 
unnecessary and confusing. The three-part standard and split of 
authority has thus left a gap for further clarification. 
C. In re M-E-V-G- Attempted to Clarify the Socially Visible 
Requirement 
In 2014, the Board again hoped to clarify the area of PSG with 
its opinion in In re M-E-V-G-.60 This case involved the PSG of 
“Honduran youth who have been actively recruited by gangs but 
who have refused to join because they oppose the gangs.”61 In 
attempting to clarify the requirements of a PSG, this case renamed 
the “socially visible” requirement to “socially distinct,” as the group 
need not be actually visible.62 To meet this requirement, the PSG 
must be perceived as a group by society, rather than by the 
persecutor.63 The Board made this distinction because it found that 
considering the persecutor’s perception would conflate the PSG 
membership requirement with the nexus requirement.64 Looking at 
“particularity,” the Board considered whether the group had 
discrete boundaries, as the group should not be “amorphous, 
overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”65 The Board never issued a final 
 
 55. Casper et al., supra note 36 (noting that the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth 
Circuits deferred to the three-part test “in full.”).  
 56. In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-,4 I. & N. Dec. 69. 
 57. Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 58. Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 603–07 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 59. Id. 
 60. In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (B.I.A. 2014). 
 61. Id. at 228. 
 62. Id. at 236. 
 63. Id. at 242. 
 64. Id. at 242. 
 65. Id. at 239. 
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decision on M-E-V-G-’s status.66 Instead, it once again attempted to 
clarify the interpretation standard and then remanded the case to 
the immigration judge.67 The standard set forth in In re M-E-V-G- 
(that perception by society, not the persecutor, is what matters) was 
specifically referenced in In re A-B-.68 However, despite the court’s 
decision in In re M-E-V-G- attempt to prevent it, Sessions ignored 
that distinction and instead focused on the perception of the 
persecutor.69 
From Acosta to In re M-E-V-G-, the standard used to determine 
a PSG has shifted repeatedly over time. This has resulted in 
uncertainty for survivors of domestic violence seeking asylum in the 
United States. This shifting has also resulted in a narrower 
interpretation of the PSG category as compared to the other 
categories eligible for asylum, making it more difficult for victims of 
domestic violence to gain asylum compared to the other eligible 
groups.70 Returning to the Acosta standard would provide stability 
and certainty to applicants under the PSG and ensure that they are 
given the same opportunity for asylum as those applying under 
other categories. 
II. The Interpretation of a Particular Social Group in 
Relation to Domestic Violence Claims 
A. In re R-A- Begins a Movement of Stricter Scrutiny of 
Domestic Violence Survivors as Refugees 
First considered in 1999, In re R-A- created an uproar after 
denying asylum to an individual, despite evidence showing that she 
had endured severe domestic abuse, as she had not shown “that the 
victims of spouse abuse view themselves as members of this group, 
nor, most importantly, that their male oppressors see their 
victimized companions as part of this group.”71 Eventually vacated, 
this decision led to an intense scrutinization of when survivors of 
domestic violence could satisfy the requirements of PSG.72 When 
considering this new case, the Department of Homeland Security 
 
 66. Id. at 253. 
 67. Id. 
 68. In re A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 330 (A.G. 2018). 
 69. Id. at 339. 
 70. See id. at 339–40. 
 71. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 918 (B.I.A. 2001) (vacating the BIA’s 1999 
decision). 
 72. Casper et al., supra note 36. 
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(DHS) looked at immutability as the key factor, but also considered 
a variety of other factors.73 The DHS found that “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship”74 met the 
Acosta standard because the group was united by two immutable 
characteristics, gender and relationship status (immutable due to 
cultural constraints).75 The DHS also noted that the size of a group 
was irrelevant when deciding whether it was cognizable, but that 
size should be considered when contemplating the nexus.76 The 
applicant was denied asylum in In re R-A-, but she did eventually 
receive asylum status with the agreement of DHS in 2010.77 In the 
meantime, however, In re R-A- had led to widespread uncertainty 
and criticism of the PSG standards.78 In hopes of reducing this 
uncertainty, the idea of “social visibility” was introduced in the In 
re C-A- decision in 2006.79 Soon after, the “social visibility” and 
“particularity” requirements were added to the Acosta standard of 
a “common immutable characteristic,” creating the three-part test 
for a PSG.80 
B. DHS’s Brief in In re L-R- Allowed More Labels to 
Successfully Define a PSG 
Decided in 2009, in In re L-R-, DHS’s brief rejected the PSG of 
“Mexican women in an abusive domestic relationship who are 
unable to leave” because it was “impermissibly ‘circular.’”81 
However, DHS’s brief noted that the PSGs of “Mexican women in 
domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and “Mexican 
women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions 
within a domestic relationship” would be sufficient.82 First, DHS 
allowed that gender and a woman’s status in a relationship may be 
“immutable.”83 Next, considering the “socially visible” prong, DHS 
suggested an objective perception standard, which could be 
evidenced by a societal view that “the status of a woman in a 
 
 73. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 917–19; see also Casper supra note 36. 
 74. Casper et al., supra note 36. 
 75. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 911. 
 76. Casper et al., supra note 36, at 7. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 959–61 (B.I.A. 2006). 
 80. See infra text accompanying note 105. 
 81. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.’s Supplemental Brief at 10–11, In re L-R- (B.I.A. 
2009). 
 82. Id. at 14. 
 83. Id. at 16. 
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domestic relationship places the woman into a segment of society 
that will not be accorded protection from harm inflicted by a 
domestic partner.”84 Finally, looking at “particularity,” DHS saw it 
could be met if the record showed the group of persons in domestic 
relationships was adequately defined.85 DHS recognized a sufficient 
nexus if the persecutor understood that the survivor was unable to 
escape or receive protection from the government.86 “[G]ender and 
status in a relationship, status in the family, and/or status in society 
can define a social group that fulfills all the current social group 
requirements.”87 As long as applicants met the three factors, this 
brief required that DHS representatives find that survivors of 
domestic violence could meet the necessary standard to show 
membership in a PSG.88 
C. Cece v. Holder89 Marked Triumph for Gender-Based 
Asylum Claims 
The idea that survivors of domestic violence could make 
successful asylum claims was exhibited again in Cece v. Holder. 
Decided by the Seventh Circuit in 2013, Cece v. Holder recognized 
“young Albanian women living alone” as a PSG.90 In this case, Cece 
feared being kidnapped by an infamous prostitution ring after being 
followed around town, offered rides, and invited on dates by a leader 
of the ring.91 As the Seventh Circuit had not adopted the 
“particularity” and “socially distinct” requirements, the court 
applied the Acosta standard rather than the three-part test.92 The 
court found Cece’s age, gender, nationality, and living status to be 
immutable characteristics, therefore meeting the Acosta 
standard.93 In its analysis, the court explained how a group can be 
defined in part by persecution, as long as that is not the group’s sole 
defining characteristic.94 The court also addressed the fear of the 
 
 84. Id. at 17–18. 
 85. Id. at 18–19 (considering how a country’s laws may define a domestic 
relationship). 
 86. Id. at 20–22. 
 87. Matter of L-R-, CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUDIES, https://cgrs.uchasti
ngs.edu/our-work/matter-l-r [https://perma.cc/RL8B-XE5N]. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 673 (7th Cir. 2013). 
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floodgates opening due to an over-broad PSG interpretation.95 The 
court astutely noted that group membership is only one step in a 
series of requirements for gaining asylum status and, therefore, the 
definition of PSG itself need not be overly burdensome.96 This case 
applied the asylum category of PSG consistently with the standards 
used for the other categories eligible for asylum and allowed for fair 
and straightforward analysis. 
D. In re A-R-C-G- Appeared to Recognize Once and for All 
that Survivors of Domestic Violence Can Qualify for 
Asylum 
Decided in 2014, In re A-R-C-G- recognized “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as a PSG.97 
The Board, remaining consistent with Acosta, found gender to be a 
common immutable characteristic sufficient to create a PSG.98 It 
also found marital status to be an immutable characteristic where 
the individual is “unable to leave the relationship.”99 The 
“particularity” requirement was also met, as the terms defining the 
group “have commonly accepted definition[s] within Guatemalan 
society.”100 The PSG was found to meet the requirement of “socially 
distinct” as the country has a “culture of ‘machismo and family 
violence’” and because, although there were laws prohibiting such 
violence, enforcement of those laws was “problematic.”101 The Board 
found that the respondent had suffered harm rising to the level of 
past persecution, that she was a member of a qualifying PSG, and 
that her membership was a central reason for her persecution.102 
This case is viewed as unambiguously establishing that survivors of 
domestic violence could qualify for asylum in the United States.103 
However, this view was soon challenged, resulting in inconsistent 
applications of the asylum standard and continuing uncertainty for 
survivors of domestic violence. 
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III. In re A-B- Limited the Ability of Domestic Violence 
Survivors to Gain Asylum 
On June 11, 2018, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions made 
a precedential ruling in In re A-B-, overruling In re A-R-C-G- and 
narrowing the interpretation of a PSG, making it more difficult for 
survivors of private crimes, like domestic violence, to gain 
asylum.104 In his ruling, Sessions applied the three-part test for 
identifying a PSG.105 Sessions’ focus in this decision was on 
“whether, and under what circumstances, being a victim of private 
criminal activity constitutes a cognizable ‘particular social group’ 
for purposes of an application for asylum or withholding of 
removal.”106 Sessions stated that applicants seeking to fit within 
such a group 
 
must establish membership in a particular and socially distinct 
group that exists independently of the alleged underlying harm, 
demonstrate that their persecutors harmed them on account of 
their membership in that group rather than for personal 
reasons, and establish that the government protection from 
such harm in their home country is so lacking that their 
persecutors’ actions can be attributed to the government.107 
A.  Overruling In re A-R-C-G- 
In re A-B- overruled In re A-R-C-G-, claiming that In re 
A-R-C-G- had failed to undertake the necessary legal and factual 
analyses and created confusion because of its expansive recognition 
of PSG based on private violence.108 In overruling In re A-R-C-G-, 
Sessions emphasized the idea that a PSG cannot be defined by its 
persecution.109 In doing so, he viewed the group of “married women 
in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship” as 
“effectively defined to consist of women in Guatemala who are 
victims of domestic abuse because the inability ‘to leave’ was 
created by harm or threatened harm.”110 The Board’s “particularity” 
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standard was also questioned by Sessions, who argued a commonly 
understood definition was insufficient, as not every characteristic is 
precise enough to define a PSG.111 In the analysis used to overrule 
In re A-R-C-G-, Sessions conflated the factors used to determine a 
PSG and further narrowed the PSG standard. 
B. Looking at the Facts 
Sessions then looked at the facts brought by Ms. A.B., who 
presented the PSG of “‘El Salvadoran women who are unable to 
leave their domestic relationships where they have children in 
common’ with their partners.”112 This description seemed to mirror 
the standard brought forth in In re R-A- (“married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship”) and the 
standard noted in In re L-R- (“Mexican women in domestic 
relationships who are unable to leave”) both of which were found 
sufficient to meet the Acosta standard by the BIA.113 When 
considering the requirements, Sessions noted that a fine line must 
be walked between defining narrow classes as to meet the 
“particularity” requirement while still providing sufficient social 
distinction to be cognizable as a “socially distinct” group.114 He 
stated, “[a] particular social group must avoid . . . being too broad to 
have definable boundaries and too narrow to have larger 
significance in society.”115 This response represents a notably 
stricter standard than those necessary for other categories eligible 
for asylum. 
Sessions found that the Board had erred in finding a nexus 
between Ms. A.B.’s harm and her group membership, as Ms. A.B. 
failed to point to any evidence of her husband’s abuse on account of 
her membership in the claimed group.116 He stated further, “[t]he 
Board cited no evidence that her husband knew any such social 
group existed, or that he persecuted wife [sic] for reasons unrelated 
to their relationship.”117 Sessions also found that the Board had 
 
 111. Id. (finding that In re A-R-C-G- held the particularity standard was met 
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erred in finding that the government was unwilling or unable to 
protect Ms. A.B.118 
C.  Moving Forward 
Sessions then set out a framework by which to present PSG 
claims moving forward, stating that, “an applicant seeking asylum 
or withholding of removal based on membership in a particular 
social group must clearly indicate . . . the exact delineation of any 
proposed particular social group.”119 In concluding his opinion, 
Sessions noted that the previous interpretations of PSG put the 
category at risk of becoming too lax and creating a catch-all category 
for individuals who failed to fit into another group.120 He then 
remanded the case to the immigration judge for further 
proceedings.121 
The consequences of this recent opinion are still being worked 
out.  Many have expressed deep concern for its impact. A group of 
former immigration judges claim that this case was not properly 
before the Attorney General and therefore should have never been 
decided in the first place.122 A group of religious organizations filed 
an amicus brief sharing its concern that such a ruling could have 
disastrous effects on survivors of religious persecution, as such 
individuals could be seen as survivors of “private criminal 
activity.”123 A third amicus brief argued that this ruling 
unnecessarily narrowed the category of PSG, when such a category 
should actually be expanded.124 
Courts’ applications of this analysis have varied.125 Several 
courts have continued to issue decisions accepting asylum claims by 
survivors of gang or domestic violence.126 The Ninth Circuit has 
determined that this ruling is not a categorical foreclosure of 
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gender-based asylum claims.127 In August of 2018, the ACLU filed 
a claim in Grace v. Whitaker, successfully challenging the 
application of In re A-B- in credible fear proceedings.128 Grace v. 
Whitaker, though primarily focused on the credible fear 
proceedings, signaled that In re A-B- should not be used as a blanket 
denial of asylum claims for survivors of domestic violence and 
signals that harsh applications of the PSG standard will be 
challenged.129 Furthermore, in the public eye, In re A-B- created a 
morality crisis as it failed to protect a vulnerable group.130 
In re A-B- still stands and its meaning continues to be 
elaborated upon and shaped by each asylum claim brought forward. 
But slight variations and reinterpretations here and there will not 
fix the issue. Instead, the standard used to determine a PSG should 
be overhauled by returning to Acosta. By simplifying the standard 
and applying it consistently with the standard used for other 
categories of asylum eligibility, the courts can promote consistency 
and certainty in the asylum system. 
IV. The In re A-B- Decision Exemplifies How the 
Requirements of “Socially Distinct” and “Particularity” 
Confuse, Rather than Clarify, What Constitutes a 
Particular Social Group 
 
The analysis brought forward by former Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions dealt with a variety of issues, the most impactful being its 
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analysis of a PSG in an asylum claim by a survivor of domestic 
violence. In his analysis, Sessions elucidated the history of 
interpretations regarding what constitutes a PSG.131 He recognized 
there was uncertainty regarding this standard and sought to clarify 
it by overruling a case he believed to be inconsistent with the 
accepted standard and by promoting guidelines to apply to the 
interpretation of a PSG.132 His application of these guidelines and 
the standards he believed to be correct were also meant to guide 
PSG determinations moving forward.133 
This analysis made asylum prospects for survivors of private 
crimes, namely gang violence and domestic violence, much 
grimmer. It was also incorrect. Sessions’ application of the 
requirements of “particularity” and “socially distinct” conflated 
various standards, making his ruling arbitrarily contrary to prior 
cases and thus improper. Therefore, this case should be viewed as 
an example of the confusion caused by these additional standards 
and this case serves as an argument as to why the Acosta standard 
should be re-implemented as the leading standard for determining 
a PSG. 
A. Where the “Socially Distinct” and “Particularity” 
Requirements Led to Conflation Rather than 
Clarification in In re A-B- 
i. Conflating How Society Views a PSG with How the 
Persecutor Views a PSG 
When determining a PSG, the analysis requires a clear 
distinction between how the persecutor views the group and how 
society perceives the group.134 As noted above, this distinction was 
made clear in In re M-E-V-G-, which stated that the PSG must be 
perceived as a group by society, rather than by the persecutor, as 
considering the perception of the persecutor would conflate the PSG 
membership requirement with the nexus requirement.135 This 
consideration would also risk defining the group by the harm 
caused. In re M-E-V-G- anticipated the risk of conflating these two 
perceptions and made it clear that the focus should be on how the 
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group is perceived by society.136 Yet, Sessions ignored this 
distinction and considered the PSG through the lens of the 
persecutor rather than through the lens of society. 
Sessions recognized the correct standard in his analysis, yet 
continued to focus on the perspective of the persecutor: “The Board 
cited no evidence that her husband knew any such social group 
existed . . . .”137 He also relied heavily on the case of In re R-A-, 
which was erroneous for two main reasons.138 First, this case was 
vacated by the Attorney General in 2001 and should therefore not 
be relied on as precedent.139 Second, this case relied heavily on the 
persecutor’s perception of the group, which, as stated in In re 
M-E-V-G-, is the incorrect lens through which to consider asylum 
claims.140 When determining if a PSG is valid, it is unnecessary to 
consider the perspective of the persecutor. Rather, that factor is 
considered when analyzing the “on account of” standard.141 By 
considering the PSG from the perspective of the persecutor, 
Sessions conflated the factors of PSG and “on account of” and 
inaccurately applied the multi-part test. 
ii. Defining the PSG by the Persecution Suffered 
The second crucial mistake made by Sessions was the 
conflation of the persecution with the label of the PSG. A PSG 
cannot by defined solely by the persecution suffered.142 Sessions 
specifically notes this rule in his analysis.143 However, he ignores 
this rule in the application of Ms. A.B.’s facts and conflates the 
ideas. This ignorance is made apparent through the phrasing of his 
goal for his analysis: “whether, and under what circumstances, 
being a victim of private criminal activity constitutes a cognizable 
‘particular social group’ for purposes of an application for asylum or 
withholding of removal.”144 As the rule above states, the PSG cannot 
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be defined solely by the persecution suffered.145 Therefore, the PSG 
cannot be defined as ‘victims’ of anything. The issue, as framed 
here, has no chance of success, as he frames the PSG brought as 
victims. This reasoning misrepresents the actual PSG brought in 
the case (“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave 
their relationship”).146 
This PSG label is not as unambiguous as Sessions claims it to 
be, as it is not clearly defined by the harm suffered. Hypothetically, 
individuals could be unable to leave their marriage for various 
reasons other than their status as survivors of a criminal activity. 
For example, cultural norms, familial pressures, or financial 
reasons could all make an individual feel they are unable to leave a 
relationship, while not being directly related to any crime. Further, 
as the PSG is not defined by the harm suffered, the question 
Sessions poses is inapplicable and attempts to undercut the 
applicant’s claim, rather than apply the correct standard for such a 
claim. Therefore, Sessions’ analysis conflates the factors necessary 
for a PSG and leads to a misapplication of the standard. 
iii. A Misapplication of the ‘Central Reason’ Idea 
Sessions also misapplies the idea that the applicant’s 
membership in the PSG must be a central reason for their 
persecution. Looking at this standard, it is clear that the 
membership in a PSG must be a reason for the persecution. 
However, shown by using the indefinite article “a” and by not using 
a definite article, “the,” or “only” in the standard, the membership 
in a particular group need not be the only reason for persecution. 
In his analysis, Sessions conflates these ideas and thus 
propagates an incorrect standard. This misapplication is made clear 
when he says, “[s]uch applicants must . . . demonstrate that their 
persecutors harmed them on account of their membership in that 
group rather than for personal reasons . . . .”147 The individual must 
demonstrate a nexus between the persecution and the membership 
in a group. However, the standard does not necessitate that the 
membership be the only reason for persecution. This standard 
ignores years of case law and arbitrarily narrows the standard, so 
it is unattainable for many valid asylum claims.148 
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This standard particularly affects the potential for successful 
asylum claims by survivors of private crimes. Many successful 
claims have come out of persecution caused not only by someone 
targeting a particular group, but by someone who knows the 
individual personally and may even have personal reasons for 
attacking that individual, in addition to that individual’s 
membership in a group. For example, in Cece v. Holder, the court 
found that Cece was being persecuted on account of her membership 
in the PSG of “young Albanian women who live alone.”149 The 
persecutor had asked Cece out on dates  which could indicate a 
personal relationship.150 In fact, the persecutor, during an attack, 
demanded to know why Cece would not go on a date with him.151 
Despite this potential personal relationship to the persecutor, the 
court granted asylum to Cece.152 This case exemplifies how the 
persecution can be based on both the membership in a PSG and 
personal relations and how personal relations should not moot 
claims for a member of a PSG. 
In many cases, it is almost essential that the persecutor have 
some personal ties to the individual they are persecuting, otherwise 
they could likely not know that the person is a member of that PSG. 
There are, of course, some exceptions to this idea. For example, if a 
persecutor is attacking someone on the basis of the color of their 
skin alone, they may have no prior knowledge of the person before 
attacking them. However, most traits are not so clearly evident. For 
example, in In re L-R-, the court determined PSGs of “Mexican 
women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” and 
“Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their 
positions within a domestic relationship” to be sufficient PSGs.153 A 
member of either of these groups would not be clearly identifiable 
as such a member when walking down the street, yet the Board 
found both groups to meet the necessary standards for PSG.154 This 
result is also exemplified by two well-accepted categories of traits 
for which a person can be persecuted outside of PSG, specifically, 
religion and political belief.155 Though such characteristics may be 
made obvious through appearance, for example, by the wearing of a 
cross or the wearing of a particular red hat, not every individual 
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with a successful claim has been attacked solely while wearing such 
a symbol. Rather, a persecutor likely has some prior experience with 
the individual, allowing the persecutor to understand the 
persecuted’s beliefs, thus leading to the persecution on account of 
such a belief. This prior meeting makes the attack fundamentally 
personal. 
iv. Pervasiveness Need Not Exclude Persecution 
In his analysis, Sessions pointed to the idea that if a 
persecution is widespread or felt by various portions of society, it is 
invalid. This implication was made clear through the idea that 
individuals who are affected by gang violence cannot make 
successful asylum claims as “victims of gang violence come from all 
segments of society.”156 And again, “[t]he pervasive nature of this 
violent criminality . . . suggested that membership in a purported 
particular social group ‘is often not a central reason for the threats 
received . . .’”157 This analysis propagates the idea that if 
persecution is too widely experienced, it can invalidate an asylum 
claim. 
However, the fact that a wide variety of people face a certain 
persecution should not render their experience of that persecution 
invalid. This misunderstanding oversimplifies what it means to be 
human. An individual is not defined by a single demographic 
characteristic. Looking at some of the more seemingly clear 
categories, characteristics can clearly cross borders. There are 
Christians of every age, Democrats in various tax brackets, and 
LGBTQ+ individuals from a variety of nationalities. It is well 
recognized that an individual is not limited to associate with only 
those exactly like them. For example, individuals from other 
categories eligible for asylum, like those with a particular religious 
or political belief, are still eligible for asylum even though they come 
from a variety of backgrounds or social settings. This same level of 
acceptance should also be available for members of a PSG. The 
inclusion in one category should not disqualify an individual from 
another. When determining eligibility for asylum, the PSG brought 
forward for the claim should be noted as just one characteristic of 
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V. Avoiding Conflation and Preserving Independence: 
Why Acosta Is the Correct Standard 
A. How the Acosta Standard Avoids the Conflation Risks 
Faced under the Three-Part Test 
Though the three-part test used to determine a valid PSG was 
created with the intent to clarify the Acosta standard, in reality, it 
only further complicated the standard and resulted in inconsistent 
and incorrect rulings. It also made the PSG category demand a 
stricter standard than the other categories, as it added additional 
qualifications to the ejusdem generis interpretation. Therefore, to 
ensure a level playing field and create more certainty in the asylum 
field, the Acosta standard should be reinstated. 
To exemplify the clarity the Acosta standard would provide, it 
is helpful to consider the analysis in In re A-R-C-G-. The PSG 
brought forward in In re A-R-C-G- was “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.”158 In the 
analysis, the Board found that “marital status can be an immutable 
characteristic where the individual is unable to leave the 
relationship.”159 Applying the Acosta standard, this group would 
therefore meet the immutable characteristic standard and be 
deemed a valid PSG. 
However, more analysis was deemed necessary, which is 
where the confusion began. The Board in In re A-R-C-G- found the 
PSG to be valid under the three-part test as well, but Sessions 
disagreed as he found the PSG to be “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, 
or subjective.”160 This split exemplifies how the three-part standard 
can lead to inconsistent decisions. 
Sessions also stated that “not every ‘immutable characteristic’ 
is sufficiently precise to define a particular social group.”161 This 
response appears to contradict the Acosta standard, which simply 
requires that the characteristic be immutable and allows the 
characteristic to be as broad as an individual’s sex.162 Though the 
three-part test claims to be consistent with the Acosta standard, it 
is not. Instead, it arbitrarily heightens the standard by creating 
additional guidelines not present in the other categories. This 
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arbitrarily fortifies the PSG category as compared to the other 
groups and leads to inconsistent analyses and rulings. To resolve 
these inconsistencies, the Acosta standard should be reinstated. 
B. How In re A-B- Would Result Under the Acosta Standard 
Though not all of the specific facts from In re A-B- are known, 
an application of the known facts considered under the Acosta 
standard is a helpful exercise. As noted above, the PSG proposed 
was “El Salvadoran women who are unable to leave their domestic 
relationships where they have children in common.”163 Applying the 
Acosta standard, it must be determined whether this PSG qualifies 
as an immutable characteristic, meaning that it “either is beyond 
the power of an individual to change or is so fundamental to 
individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be 
changed.”164 Both innate characteristics as well as shared past 
experiences were sufficient to meet the PSG standard in Acosta.165 
Ms. A-B-’s PSG would therefore be sufficient as it is based on 
gender, an accepted characteristic, and it involves a characteristic 
beyond the individual’s ability to change. The PSG itself makes this 
clear as the label itself involves an inability to change (“unable to 
leave”). Therefore, this PSG meets the Acosta standard for PSG. 
Prior cases involving similar PSGs support that Ms. A.B. 
meets the Acosta standard. In In re R-A- “married women in 
Guatemala who are unable to leave the relationship” was deemed 
sufficient under the Acosta standard.166 In In re L-R-, “Mexican 
women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” was also 
found to be sufficient under the Acosta standard.167 As the PSG put 
forth in Ms. A.B.’s case strongly mirrors previously accepted PSGs, 
it should be deemed sufficient. 
However, it is important to note that the wording of the PSG 
in In re A-B- was likely artificially framed because the three-part 
test was the standard at the time it was created. This arbitrary 
standard challenged those bringing PSG claims to create a group 
that was broad enough to fulfill the “socially distinct” requirement 
while also being specific enough to fulfill the “particularity” 
requirement. Whereas the Board in Acosta stated that “sex” alone 
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was enough to satisfy a PSG,168 further attempts to clarify this 
standard and narrow the meaning of PSG resulted in applicants 
being forced to make up almost incoherent PSGs in order to satisfy 
a standard that was not necessary in the first place. So, too, in Ms. 
A.B.’s case, the PSG was likely worded more unnaturally than it 
would have been under the Acosta standard in order to meet the 
fine balance between the narrowness needed to meet the 
particularity standard and the breadth necessary to reach the social 
visibility standard. If the Acosta standard had been in place at the 
time of this case, it is likely the PSG label would have been framed 
differently; for example, just by the individual’s sex. According to 
Acosta, such a label would be valid. Ms. A-B- would still have had 
to meet the other factors necessary for asylum, but her claim would 
not have been prematurely denied because of uncertainties and 
balancing acts done to appease arbitrary and unnecessary rules. 
 
 
C. The Risk of Opening the Floodgates to Asylum Claims 
with the Acosta Standard Is No Real Risk at All 
Various courts and policymakers have expressed concerns 
regarding a floodgates issue if a broader standard like Acosta is 
implemented regarding asylum claims.169 However, this worry is 
unsubstantiated. In this analogy, the floodgates are the last 
restraint before the water is allowed to gush in. However, a different 
standard of PSG is not enough to create such a flooding of applicants 
into the asylum system. 
First, the Acosta standard is not a total lack of a standard, but 
rather, a simpler and more reasonable standard. As stated in the 
Acosta decision, this standard was created using the interpretation 
tool of ejusdem generis (“of the same kind”) meaning it is held to the 
same strictness as the other categories for obtaining an asylum 
claim.170 Therefore, such a standard allows the same level of 
scrutiny for a PSG as is allowed for the other categories. Such a 
standard would also avoid a prioritization of certain groups over 
others, as is currently the case. 
Second, the PSG standard is just one factor in a multi-part 
test. The individual must be “unable or unwilling to return to, and 
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is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, 
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of . . . ” a category such as a PSG.171 
Therefore, an overly strict standard for the PSG factor is not only 
unnecessary but it conflates, and therefore moots, the other factors 
of this test. The application of the Acosta standard, on the other 
hand, maintains each factor as a separate category, giving each 
factor a purpose and creates a sufficiently strict and functional test 
for asylum. 
Under the Acosta standard, a PSG could be defined by sex 
alone. However, this definition would by no means entitle every 
male or female to obtain asylum in the United States. This standard 
could still be difficult to meet as a survivor of domestic violence. 
Proving a nexus related to this group could be difficult, but it would 
not be impossible. For example, in In re A-R-C-G-, the court found 
that the individual came from a country that had a “culture of 
‘machismo and family violence.’”172 In In re L-R-, the court noted 
that “Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their 
positions within a domestic relationship” would be an eligible 
PSG.173 Both of these cases recognized that a certain sex could be 
seen as lesser than based on cultural norms. The existence of these 
norms and the acts of an individual towards someone of a certain 
sex because of these norms should be seen as satisfying the “on 
account of” requirement. The framework set forth in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act ensures that an individual must 
meet multiple factors before receiving asylum status, thus 
mitigating the fears of an opening of the floodgates.174 
In addition to the standard set out in the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, there are additional barriers to meeting the 
definition of a “refugee.” For example, the idea of internal relocation 
as a defense creates a strong checks and balances system on asylum 
claims regarding “private crimes.”175 If an individual is able to 
relocate within their own country and avoid persecution, they are 
not eligible for asylum.176 If an individual is facing persecution at 
the hands of a small group or a single individual, internal relocation 
would appear to provide a simple solution. For asylum claims, all 
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factors must be considered and the test as a whole, rather than the 
individual factor of PSG. Considering all factors and the test as a 
whole will sufficiently prevent a floodgates issue. 
D. The Acosta Standard Interprets PSGs Consistently with 
the Other Eligible Categories 
Sessions’ reasoning in In re A-B- narrowed the definition of a 
PSG as compared to other groups. Instead of interpreting PSG 
consistently, he made it more difficult for those applying under the 
PSG category to make a successful claim. Sessions argued that this 
narrowing is not unfair as asylum claims are just one of many 
options for those fleeing harm.177 He referenced the opinion of Judge 
Wilkinson, who noted that the “Board’s recent treatment of [PSG] 
is ‘at risk of lacking rigor.’”178 However, this argument hints at the 
idea that those seeking asylum under the category of PSG should 
be treated differently than those seeking it under another category. 
The standard put forward in Acosta was specifically created as a 
comparison to the other categories, using the interpretive canon of 
ejusdem generis in order to put all those seeking asylum on a level 
playing field.179 The subsequent cases added additional 
qualifications, heightening the standard for a PSG as compared to 
the other categories. As each category is listed in the statute, with 
no other qualifications listed for a specific group, these categories 
should not be implemented using varying levels of scrutiny. Rather, 
the individuals applying under each category should be treated 
equally. This framework was not implemented with an idea of a 
prioritization between religion versus political belief versus any 
other category. Rather, those categories allow individuals from a 
variety of backgrounds and situations to receive asylum. In order 
that this framework is implemented with the equality that was 
intended, the Acosta standard should be reinstated. 
E. Asylum to a Country where the Problem Persists 
As mentioned above, there has been significant backlash 
following the ruling in In re A-B-.180 Not only is Sessions’ legal 
analysis concerning, but so too are the effects of this decision. This 
decision has led to increased uncertainty for applicants and 
individuals being deported from a place where they feel safe. 
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Sympathy and a sense of moral obligation towards this group 
persists in the wake of In re A-B-. However, these scenarios pose an 
interesting dilemma to Americans that may not be as prevalent 
with other individuals applying for asylum. Often, refugees are 
viewed as survivors of horrible crimes and are welcomed to the 
United States in order to escape such crimes. Underlying this 
concept is the idea that such horrendous acts do not happen in the 
United States. With domestic violence claims, however, this 
argument weakens. Domestic violence is unfortunately prevalent in 
the United States.181 In fact, a relatively large portion of violent 
crime in the United States is committed by the survivor’s intimate 
partner.182 Should any less sympathy be felt for asylum applicants 
because individuals are facing similar horrors in our own country? 
Of course not. Rather, these individuals should be provided with the 
opportunity to receive an equal level of protection as that provided 
to individuals who are facing crimes less common in the United 
States. 
Additionally, a factor necessary for a successful asylum claim 
is that the government in the applicant’s country is unwilling or 
unable to help the individual. In the United States, though the 
problem of domestic violence persists, the government attempts to 
provide recourse in ways potentially not available in the country 
from which the applicant is fleeing.183 By providing an applicant 
asylum, the United States would be allowing the individual to 
escape their persecutor and find a home in a place that is taking 
steps, albeit slowly, to overcome the problem of domestic violence. 
Conclusion 
In his analysis in In re A-B-, former Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions overruled important precedent regarding gender-based 
asylum claims and narrowed the interpretation of such claims, 
making it more difficult for survivors of private crimes, namely 
gang and domestic violence, to seek asylum in the United States. 
However, Sessions’ analysis, when determining if the PSG met the 
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three-part test of 1) immutability, 2) particularity, and 3) social 
visibility, conflated various factors. This conflation arbitrarily 
discounted prior case law and created further confusion regarding 
the standard to be applied for such claims. Therefore, In re A-B- 
serves as a strong example of the confusion these additional 
requirements cause and makes a strong case as to why this three-
part test should be abolished and the Acosta standard should be 
reinstated for determining PSG claims. The Acosta standard would 
ensure that the category of PSG is interpreted consistently with the 
other groups, avoid conflation, prevent individuals from creating 
overly complex groups to fulfill an arbitrary standard, and provide 
certainty and stability to applicants going through the asylum 
system. The courts should reinstate the Acosta standard to give 
those with legitimate and satisfactory asylum claims, like Ms. A.B., 
the status they rightfully deserve. 
